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This paper investigates the determinants of migrants’ financial transfers to
their home country using German data. A double-hurdle model is applied to
analyze the determinants of the propensity to send transfers abroad and the
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rect specification for the analysis of migrants’ savings and remittances rather
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Due to the increasing relevance of international migration, the economic performance
of migrants represents an important factor for both the immigration and sending
countries. In the receiving countries, the economic situation of the foreign-born
population and the economic and societal integration of immigrant minorities into
the host-countries’ society have become a matter of intense debate among economists
and policy makers. At the same time, the economic situation of migrants has become
increasingly important for the sending countries because migrants’ remittances have
grown to the largest source of external funding in many emigration countries.
The economic literature on the performance of immigrants in their host country
concentrates predominantly on the analysis of migrants’ earnings and employment
status (Borjas, 1994; Zimmermann, 2005). Only a few studies have examined the
wealth accumulation patterns of immigrants in their home countries (Bauer and
Sinning, 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006), although migrants’ savings and
investment abroad may represent a substantial or even the major part of their overall
ﬁnancial transfers (Brown, 1994). An investigation of such a long-run indicator of
economic well-being may be relevant because the capacity of immigrants to accumu-
late wealth in their home countries does not only reﬂect their economic performance
in the host country but also allows to draw inferences about their future economic
situation.
According to the World Bank (2006a), remittances in 2005 have exceeded US$
233 billion worldwide. Moreover, recorded remittances to developing countries have
doubled between 2000 and 2005, indicating a substantial increase in payments of
migrants to their families abroad. The traditional development literature has largely
focused on the size and potential impact of migrants’ remittances (Adams, 1992;
Durand et al., 1996). In addition, a sizeable theoretical and empirical literature has
revealed that a variety of motives may induce migrants to send remittances to their
countries of origin (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Bernheim et al., 1985; Cox, 1987; Cox
and Rank, 1992; Cox et al., 1987; Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999; Amuedo-Dorantes and
Pozo, 2006).
4Despite the increasing importance of the long-run economic situation of migrants
and the growing impact of their remittances, only a few studies investigate migrants’
savings and remittances jointly. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) analyze both
savings and remittances of Mexican immigrants in the US. They demonstrate that
immigrants remit a substantial part of their labor earnings for family-provided in-
surance as well as for self-insurance. Merkle and Zimmermann (1992) examine
migrants’ savings in Germany and their transfers abroad. They ﬁnd that return in-
tentions signiﬁcantly aﬀect migrants’ remittances but do not inﬂuence their savings
behavior. Considering both migrants’ savings in the home and host country, Bauer
and Sinning (2005) demonstrate that immigrants who intend to stay in Germany
only temporarily save signiﬁcantly more than permanent migrants.
Germany, a major immigration country in the European Union, represents an
excellent example for the analysis of the importance of migrants’ savings and re-
mittances. Since about 1.5 million immigrants in Germany will reach retirement
age within the next 15 years, both savings and return intentions of immigrants may
become important factors for the German pension system. Even though the major-
ity of the foreign-born population in Germany does not originate from developing
countries, immigrants residing in Germany remit a substantial part of their income.
In 2004, remittance ﬂows from Germany amounted to US$ 10.4 billion (World Bank,
2006b). A sizeable part of these transfers consists of savings-related remittances of
temporary migrants (Merkle and Zimmermann, 1992; Bauer and Sinning, 2005).
This paper aims at providing empirical evidence on the relative importance of
the determinants of migrants’ transfers to their home countries, paying particular
attention to their return intentions and household composition in the home and host
country. In the empirical analysis, which is based on data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), diﬀerent types of transfers will be distinguished, namely
savings, payments to family members and other persons abroad as well as transfers
that are sent to the home country for other reasons. In addition to the Tobit model,
which accounts for the censored nature of the dependent variables, a double-hurdle
model will be applied to assess the eﬀects of relevant determinants on the individual
decision to send transfers abroad and the amount of transfers.
5The paper contributes to the existing literature in several respects. Firstly,
empirical evidence on the determinants of migrants’ remittances is generated by
examining micro-level data from immigrants to Germany. While the major part
of the existing literature on remittances mainly concentrates on migrants’ trans-
fers to developing countries, the analysis focuses on remittances of migrants’ from
traditional labor-exporting countries, such as Turkey, Italy and Greece as well as
refugees originating from former Yugoslavian countries. Secondly, in addition to mi-
grants’ payments to family members in their countries of origin which are typically
addressed by the literature on remittances, the analysis of German data allows an
explicit consideration of migrants’ savings in their home countries as a relevant part
of their overall transfers. Finally, a double-hurdle model is applied to account for
diﬀerences between the stochastic processes that determine the decision of immi-
grants to remit and the level of remittances. Existing studies have often adopted
more restrictive models for binary or censored dependent variables to assess the
determinants of migrants’ remittances.
The empirical ﬁndings reveal that return intentions positively aﬀect ﬁnancial
transfers of immigrants to their home country. Moreover, while the eﬀect of the
household size on migrants’ transfers abroad turns out to be signiﬁcantly negative,
remittances are higher if close relatives live in the sending country. Women are
less likely to send transfers abroad and – given that their payments are positive –
also send smaller amounts abroad than comparable men. While the current gross
income increases migrants’ savings and payments to persons abroad, the variation of
past income streams increases the amount of other transfers to the sending countries,
indicating that these transfers represent insurance payments to some extent. Finally,
Vuong-tests indicate that the double-hurdle model is the correct speciﬁcation for the
analysis of remittances rather than the conventional Tobit model usually applied in
the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a short survey of the existing
literature on the determinants of migrants’ remittances. Section 3 describes the
empirical strategy and the data used for the analysis. The estimation results are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
62 Determinants of migrants’ remittances
An extensive literature provides theoretical and empirical evidence on general mo-
tives behind migrants’ remittances and outlines relevant determinants. Using data
from the National Migration Study of Botswana, Lucas and Stark (1985) were the
ﬁrst to note that – in addition to altruism – a variety of motives could play a decisive
role in determining remittances. They considered the strategy to secure inheritance
and the desire to invest in assets at home as “pure self-interest” and designated the
motives behind remittances that were based on implicit contractual agreements be-
tween migrant and family as “tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest”. These
motives could include, for example, repayments for a previous educational invest-
ment in the migrant or payments that insure migrants against income losses in the
host country.
Several studies have provided evidence in support of these hypotheses. Bernheim
et al. (1985) suggest that family members in the sending country may use their pos-
sibility of depriving migrants of their rights to inheritance to secure remittances.
At the same time, expectations about future bequests may induce migrants to send
remittances to their home country. Cox (1987) argues that altruism and exchange
(such as repayments of educational costs or the purchase of services) are major mo-
tives behind migrants’ remittances. Cox and Rank (1992) ﬁnd empirical patterns
for inter-vivos transfers (i.e. transfers between living persons) that are more con-
sistent with exchange than altruism. Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) provide evidence on
repayments of loans aimed at ﬁnancing international migration. Finally, Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2006) demonstrate that migrants do not only send remittances
to their home country to insure family members against income losses (Coate and
Ravallion, 1993) but also to insure themselves.
Although a sizeable literature has attempted to discriminate between various
motivations to remit, empirical evidence on the determinants of migrants’ savings
in their countries of origin is rather scarce. However, a number of studies has high-
lighted the relevance of migrants’ savings in their home countries. Using data from
the 1979 Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys, Amuedo-Dorantes and
7Pozo (2002) compare migrants’ savings in the US to those of comparable natives.
They ﬁnd that immigrants save signiﬁcantly less than comparable natives and ar-
gue that the apparent lower precautionary savings of immigrants may be caused by
the fact that immigrants engage in precautionary saving by remitting parts of their
income to their countries of origin. Merkle and Zimmermann (1992) investigate
migrants’ savings in the host country as well as remittances using data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). They ﬁnd that migrants’ return intentions
signiﬁcantly aﬀect their remittances but do not inﬂuence their savings behavior.
Based on these results, they conclude that temporary migrants hold savings mainly
in their home countries. Using the same data source, Bauer and Sinning (2005)
demonstrate that immigrants who intend to return to their home country save sig-
niﬁcantly more than permanent migrants if both savings in the home and in the
host country are taken into account.
The theoretical and empirical literature on savings and remittances has high-
lighted a number of variables that may be relevant in explaining migrants’ transfer
behavior. Galor and Stark (1990) demonstrate that the positive probability of im-
migrants to return to their home countries positively aﬀect their savings behavior.
Return intentions have also been identiﬁed as a major determinant of migrants’
payments to family members abroad by a number of studies on remittances (see
Docquier and Rapoport, 2005 for a review).
Most empirical studies on migrants’ remittances have focused on income eﬀects
to assess the degree of altruism that may be inferred from the migrants’ behav-
ior. The pure altruism hypothesis, which postulates unity of the transfer-income
derivative, could be rejected by several studies on transfers in developed and unde-
veloped economies (Cox, 1987; Cox et al., 1987; Altonji et al., 1997). In addition to
income, migrants’ transfers are likely to be aﬀected by income uncertainties. Fol-
lowing the literature on risk-diversiﬁcation within families (Stark, 1991), Dustmann
(1997) demonstrates that immigrants may accumulate more precautionary savings
than comparable natives if they face high income uncertainties on the labor market
of their host country. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) show that income risks
may increase migrants’ insurance payments to their countries of origin to smooth
8future consumption after remigration.
Following the contribution of Lucas and Stark (1985), the literature on the deter-
minants of remittances has also focused on the migrants’ family background in the
home and host countries. Speciﬁcally, empirical studies have shown that the mari-
tal status and the household size and composition in the migrants’ home and host
country are important determinants of remittances (Hodinott, 1994; de la Briere et
al., 2002).
In addition to the determinants of migrants’ savings and remittances presented
above, a number of socio-economic and demographic characteristics may also aﬀect
transfers of immigrants to their home country. In particular, age, gender, education
and the employment status have proved to be relevant in explaining both migrants’
savings and remittances (see, e.g., Cox, 1987; Cox et al., 1987; de la Briere et al.,
2002; Merkle and Zimmermann, 1992; Bauer and Sinning, 2005). Moreover, the
transfer behavior of immigrants may also be inﬂuenced by their migration back-
ground. In particular, since the migration process leads immigrants to be a highly
selected group of individuals (Borjas, 1987), both savings and remittances may vary
substantially across countries of origin. Funkhouser (1995) demonstrates that self-
selection of immigrants may have a decisive inﬂuence on migrants’ remittances. The
savings behavior may also be aﬀected by the cultural background of immigrants
(Carroll et al., 1994, 1999). Finally, in addition to source country variations, diﬀer-
ences between immigration cohorts might exist. Speciﬁcally, migrants’ remittances
typically decline as the duration of residence in the host country increases (DeVoretz
and Vadean, 2005), while wealth levels of more established immigrants in their host
countries tend to be higher than those of more recent immigration cohorts (Bauer et
al., 2007), suggesting that the length of stay in the host country might have positive
eﬀects on migrants’ savings abroad.
The objective of the following analysis is to generate empirical evidence on the
relative importance of the determinants of migrants’ ﬁnancial transfers, taking into
account the factors mentioned above. Since these factors may have diﬀerent eﬀects
on the propensity to send transfers abroad and the amount of transfers, a double-
hurdle model is applied which allows a separate consideration of the underlying
9stochastic processes.
3 Empirical strategy and data
While investigating the determinants of migrants’ savings and remittances, the cen-
sored nature of the outcome variable has to be taken into account. In particular,
it seems likely that a substantial part of the foreign-born population does not send
transfers abroad. One way to tackle this problem is to use a Tobit model (Tobin,
1958) which has been applied in previous studies on both savings and remittances
(Merkle and Zimmermann, 1992; Rodriguez, 1996; Cox et al., 1987). An important
shortcoming of the Tobit model is that zero values are considered as corner solution
outcomes although the stochastic process that describes the individual decision to
send transfers abroad may diﬀer considerably from the one that governs the de-
cision about the amount of transfers. Speciﬁcally, in the context of savings and
remittances, the use of the Tobit model implies that an interior solution occurs if
the interest rate is suﬃciently high or the price of sending transfers abroad is suf-
ﬁciently low (see also Yen et al., 1997). However, a sizeable part of the immigrant
population never sends ﬁnancial transfers abroad regardless of prices, interest rates
and income. Such “non-participation” decisions have to be considered in addition
to corner solution outcomes.
A model that may be applied if the participation decision and the level of the
dependent variable are determined by diﬀerent stochastic processes is the double-
hurdle model which represents a generalization of the Tobit model. The double-
hurdle model extends the Tobit model by allowing for a separate ﬁrst hurdle that
reﬂects the (binary) participation decision. Assuming that the error terms of the
stochastic processes of level and participation decisions are uncorrelated leads to
the independent double-hurdle model, while the dependent double-hurdle model ac-
counts for the possible correlation between the two error terms. As a result of the
presence of continuous observations on the dependent variable, exclusion restric-
tions are not required for a separate identiﬁcation of the stochastic processes of
the independent double-hurdle model (Blundell and Meghir, 1987). To derive the
10double-hurdle model with independent error terms, consider latent participation d∗










with error terms ε1 ∼ N(0,1) and ε2 ∼ N(0,σ2). β1 and β2 are the parameter vec-
tors to be estimated. Since the double-hurdle model is based on the assumption that
the error terms are normally distributed, the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) trans-
formation (Burbidge et al., 1988) of the observed dependent variable is frequently
applied (Yen and Jones, 1997). The IHS transformation is given by






where γ represents an additional model parameter. The IHS transformation ap-
proximates log(y) for large values of y. In the empirical analysis, it is assumed that
γ = 1. The IHS double-hurdle model may be written as
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where Ω0 = {i|yi =0 },Ω0 = {i|yi  =0 } and Ω0∪Ω1 = {1,2,...,N}. When γ = 0, the
likelihood function reduces to that of the independent double-hurdle model (Cragg,
1971; Blundell and Meghir, 1987).
The elasticities of the IHS double-hurdle model are given by the derivation of the
unconditional mean with respect to the explanatory variables. The unconditional




























The standard errors for the elasticities may be derived using mathematical approx-
imation (Fuller, 1987).
In the following empirical analysis, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP) is utilized.1 The SOEP is a representative longitudinal study including Ger-
man and immigrant households residing in the old and new German states which
started in 1984. In 2005, more than 20,000 persons in about 12,000 households
were sampled. The panel contains information about socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics, household composition, occupational biographies, etc. The
empirical analysis is restricted to immigrants between 18 and 64 years who are not
registered unemployed. Immigrants are deﬁned as foreign-born persons who immi-
grated to Germany since 1948. Due to the small number of observations, the sample
does not include ethnic migrants from Central and Eastern Europe who received
German citizenship after immigration. Since less than two percent of the migrant
population in the sample lives in East Germany, the analysis concentrates on im-
migrants residing in West Germany. Moreover, the year 1984 is not considered in
the regression analysis because lag variables have to be generated for some of the
explanatory variables of the model.
The SOEP contains detailed information about transfers of foreigners to their
home country between 1984 and 1995. Immigrants were asked initially whether they
sent any ﬁnancial transfers to their home country. This information could be used
to construct an indicator variable that diﬀerentiates between “participants” and
1The data used in this paper were extracted from the GSOEP Database pro-
vided by the DIW Berlin (http://www.diw.de/GSOEP) using the Add-On package
PanelWhiz v1.0 (Oct 2006) for Stata(R). PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P.
Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The PanelWhiz generated DO ﬁle to retrieve
the GSOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available upon request.
Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew and
Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
12“non-participants”. Additionally, the amount of three diﬀerent types of transfers
may be observed, namely savings for later, support for the family and transfers
for other reasons. After 1995, only the amount of transfers to persons abroad is
available. Therefore, the analysis is limited to the examination of this rather general
outcome measure between 1996 and 2005. Since participation and level decisions
were again surveyed separately, a dummy variable indicating whether immigrants
sent remittances abroad could also be constructed for the sample period 1996-2005.
In the empirical analysis, a number of socio-economic and demographic charac-
teristics are considered as explanatory variables of migrants’ transfers to the home
country. These variables include a squared function of age, the household gross
income, the number of years of education and indicator variables for the migrants’
employment status, gender and the attendance of school in Germany. Moreover, the
variance of the average income of the last ﬁve years is used as a proxy variable for
income risk. In general, it may be expected that migrants facing greater income risk
are more likely to send transfers abroad and transfer more than migrants facing less
income risk (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006).
In addition to these characteristics, the set of explanatory variables includes
information about the household composition, such as the household size, the marital
status and the presence of children in the household. Unfortunately, the SOEP
does not contain information about the household size of immigrants in their home
country. Instead, dummy variables indicating whether the spouse or children of the
respondent live abroad are included into the regression equation. In order to avoid
causality problems, lag variables are used for some of the explanatory variables in
the regression model.
Since all kinds of transfers may be observed for both temporary and permanent
migrants, diﬀerences between the two groups are taken into account in the empir-
ical analysis. In particular, the SOEP provides information on the intentions of
immigrants to stay in Germany. This information is used to generate a dummy
variable for return intentions. Finally, diﬀerences between immigration cohorts and
immigrants originating from diﬀerent source countries are considered by including
the number of years since migration and a set of source country indicators into
13the model. The sample is restricted to immigrants from OECD member countries
and former Yugoslavian countries. Source country indicators were generated for
immigrants from major traditional labor-exporting countries, namely Turkey, Italy
and Greece as well as for immigrants from former Yugoslavia.2 After excluding all
observations with missing values on one of the variables used in the analysis, the
panel data set contains 12,732 person-year-observations of 2,189 individuals for the
period 1985-1995 and 8,849 person-year-observations of 1,860 persons for the period
1996-2005.
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 reveal that the proportion of im-
migrants who save abroad in the period from 1985 to 1995 is 4.5%, while 7.5% of
the foreign-born population sends transfers to their home country for other rea-
sons. Moreover, the share of immigrants who send payments to family members
in their countries of origin amounts to 24.0%, indicating that these payments are
relatively more important if compared to savings and other transfers abroad. While
immigrants save on average about 16 Euros per month in their home country, the
average amount of savings of persons reporting positive values is about 355 Euros
(10.3% of the household gross income), suggesting that savings abroad seem to be
highly relevant for a part of the foreign-born population. On average, immigrants
remit about 19 Euros per month to their home country for other reasons. Given that
these transfers are positive, more than 250 Euros (7.9% of gross income) are sent
abroad for other reasons. The unconditional amount of migrants’ payments to fam-
ily members abroad is about 56 Euros, the conditional amount is about 234 Euros
(8.7% of gross income). 13.1% of the foreign-born individuals report to send remit-
tances abroad between 1996 and 2005. While the average amount of remittances is
about 23 Euros, migrants send more than 170 Euros (6.8% of gross income) to their
home country given that their remittances are positive. Overall, the proportion of
migrants reporting to send ﬁnancial transfers abroad is 31.8% in the period from
1985 to 1995. Given the information about migrants’ payments to persons abroad
after 1995, the corresponding share amounts to 15.0%.
2A detailed description of the deﬁnition of variables used in the analysis is given
in the Appendix.
14The mean values presented in the bottom part of Table 1 expose that some of
the explanatory variables have changed considerably between the sample periods
1985-1995 and 1996-2005. In particular, the share of immigrants originating from
countries other than Turkey, Italy, Greece and former Yugoslavia has increased to
26.0% in the sample period after 1995. In addition to the changing nationality mix
within the foreign-born population in Germany (see Bauer et al., 2005 for details),
a substantial part of these diﬀerences may be attributed to a change in the sample
design. In 1994 and 1995, two additional sub-samples of immigrant households were
appended to the SOEP (Frick and Haisken-DeNew, 2005). As a consequence of these
changes, return intentions have declined over time. Particularly, while the majority
of the guest-worker generation observed before 1996 (64.3%) wishes to remain in
Germany temporarily, only 39.3% of the foreign-born population surveyed between
1996 and 2005 plans to return to the country of origin.
4 Results
This section presents the IHS Tobit and IHS double-hurdle estimates of migrants’
savings and remittances. The estimates of savings and other transfers of the sample
period 1985-1995 are presented in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 includes the corresponding
results for payments to family members and other persons residing abroad, using
the available information of the periods 1985-1995 and 1996-2005.
In addition to the double-hurdle model with independent error terms, a depen-
dent double-hurdle model was estimated. Wald tests were performed to test the
dependency of the stochastic processes of the double-hurdle model. The test re-
sults reveal that participation and level equations are independent for all types of
transfers observed between 1985 and 1995. The corresponding estimates of the cor-
relation coeﬃcients of the dependent double-hurdle models conﬁrm these ﬁndings.
For the dependent double-hurdle model of the period after 1995, convergence could
not be achieved. Consequently, the following tables include the estimates of the
independent rather than those of the dependent double-hurdle model.
To investigate whether the independent IHS double-hurdle model is more appro-
15priate in modeling migrants’ transfers abroad than the IHS Tobit model, the test
procedure proposed by Vuong (1989) was applied (see also Yen, 2005). In all cases,
the results of the Vuong-tests indicate that the double-hurdle model represents a
more suitable way of modeling migrants’ ﬁnancial transfers than the Tobit model.3
4.1 Savings and other transfers
Tables 2 and 3 include the estimates of IHS Tobit and independent IHS double-hurdle
models, using information about migrants’ savings and other transfers abroad as de-
pendent variables. The marginal eﬀects of these models denote the size and direction
of the impact of the explanatory variables on the savings level. In particular, the
(semi-)elasticities of the double-hurdle model, which were evaluated at the respec-
tive means of the independent variables, indicate the eﬀect of a change in one of the
explanatory variables on the unconditional mean of the dependent variable.4 More-
over, the coeﬃcients of the participation and level equations of the double-hurdle
model denote the inﬂuence of the explanatory variables on the probability to send
transfers abroad and the (conditional) monthly amount of transfers, respectively.
The estimates in Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence for an inverted U-shaped
transfer-age proﬁle which is consistent with the implications of the inter-temporal
consumption model (see, e.g., Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). The ﬁndings also
reveal that immigrant women are on average less likely to send savings or other
transfers abroad and – given that their transfers are positive – send signiﬁcantly less
to their home country than average men. This result is in line with the literature
on the labor market activity of immigrants which ﬁnds that foreign-born women are
economically less active than comparable foreign-born men (Basilio et al., 2007).
Income positively aﬀects migrants’ savings, while the income eﬀect on other
transfers abroad is insigniﬁcant. However, the double-hurdle estimates show that
income volatility increases the amount of migrants’ other transfers abroad, indicating
3All test results and the corresponding estimates are available from the author
upon request.
4The elasticities are not strictly deﬁned for binary explanatory variables. The
reported values are actually changes in the dependent variable in response to the
change in the binary variable from zero to one.
16that these transfers represent insurance payments to some extent (see Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). The income elasticity of the double-hurdle model reveals
that an income increase of 1% raises savings by 0.08%. Even after controlling for
income, the employment status has an additional eﬀect on migrants’ savings and
other transfers. While the length of education does not aﬀect savings but reduces
the amount of other transfers abroad, immigrants exhibit higher savings if they
attended school in Germany.
The household size in Germany negatively determines savings abroad, while the
household size eﬀect on other transfers abroad is insigniﬁcant. The marginal ef-
fects of the double-hurdle model reveal that average married immigrants accumulate
about 10% more wealth in their home country and send about 17% more transfers
abroad than average single immigrants. The presence of children in the household
does not inﬂuence savings and other transfers abroad. Moreover, immigrants whose
spouse or children have remained in the country of origin do not save or send signif-
icantly more transfers abroad for other reasons than comparable immigrants whose
closest relatives reside in Germany. This result implies that migrants’ transfers
which are sent abroad for other reasons do not seem to be intended for consumption
of family members in the home country.
The marginal eﬀects of the double-hurdle models reveal that temporary migrants
save on average 16.7% more and send 20.6% more other transfers to their home coun-
try than permanent migrants. This eﬀect is attributable to the fact that migrants,
who intent to return to their home country, are more likely to save or send other
transfers abroad than migrants who intent to stay in Germany permanently. Given
that migrants’ transfers to their home country are positive, the eﬀect of return
intentions on the amount of savings and other transfers is not signiﬁcant.
The eﬀects of the years since migration reveal that the duration of residence in
Germany appears to be a weak predictor of migrants’ savings and other transfers.
Finally, the marginal eﬀects of the source country indicators in the double-hurdle
model reveal that saving disparities across countries are insigniﬁcant, while source
country diﬀerences with respect to other transfers seem to exist. Speciﬁcally, while
Italian and Greek immigrants have a lower propensity to send transfers abroad, the
17savings level of Turkish immigrants is signiﬁcantly higher than that of immigrants
originating from other source countries.
4.2 Transfers to persons abroad
Tables 4 and 5 contain the estimates of IHS Tobit and independent IHS double-
hurdle models, using information about payments to family members surveyed be-
tween 1985 and 1995 as well as payments to persons abroad surveyed between 1996
and 2005 as dependent variables. Similar to the estimates presented in Section 4.1,
an inverted U-shaped transfer-age proﬁle is also observed for migrants’ payments to
persons in the home country. In addition, immigrant women send signiﬁcantly less
transfers to persons abroad than comparable men. The income elasticities of the
double-hurdle model, which range between 0.07% and 0.13%, indicate that the pure
altruism hypothesis of migrants’ payments to persons abroad may be rejected (Al-
tonji et al., 1997). Moreover, the variation of past income streams does not aﬀect
migrants’ payments to persons abroad, while employment eﬀects are signiﬁcantly
positive.
While the length of education appears to play a minor role in explaining re-
mittances, migrants’ payments to family members are signiﬁcantly lower if they
attended school in Germany. Household size eﬀects on migrants’ payments to per-
sons abroad are signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting that migrants residing in relatively
large households do not have the ﬁnancial capacity to remit sizeable amounts to their
home country. In contrast, married immigrants send larger amounts of remittances
to persons abroad than singles. The presence of children in the household has no ad-
ditional eﬀect on migrants’ payments abroad. Instead, remittances are substantially
higher if close relatives live in the country of origin. According to the double-hurdle
model, remittances observed between 1985 and 1995 increase by about 130% if the
migrants’ spouse or the children reside in the sending country. Between 1996 and
2005, a similar eﬀect may be observed for migrants whose spouse lives abroad, while
the corresponding eﬀect of children residing in the home country is insigniﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects of return intentions suggest that temporary
migrants are more likely to remit and remit a higher amount to persons abroad
18than permanent migrants. The marginal eﬀects of return intentions on migrants’
payments to persons abroad are somewhat larger than the corresponding eﬀects
on savings and other transfers. While temporary migrants surveyed between 1985
and 1995 remit on average 32.6% more than permanent migrants, remittances of
temporary migrants are 23.8% higher than those of average permanent migrants
in the period 1996-2005. Moreover, in contrast to the Tobit model, the estimates
of the double-hurdle model reveal that the number of years since migration do not
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on migrants’ transfers to family members abroad. For
the sample period after 1995, the eﬀect of the duration of residence is insigniﬁcant
in both the Tobit and the double-hurdle model. Finally, the marginal eﬀects of the
source country indicators exhibit that immigrants originating from Italy remit less,
while immigrants from Turkey, Greece and former Yugoslavia remit more to their
countries of origin than immigrants from other source regions.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence on the relative importance of the determi-
nants of migrants’ transfers to their country of origin, paying particular attention
to return intentions and migrants’ household composition in the home and host
country. In the empirical analysis, which is based on data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), the determinants of diﬀerent types of transfers (savings,
payments to persons abroad and other transfers) are being investigated. In addition
to the Tobit model, which accounts for the censored nature of the dependent vari-
ables, a dependent double-hurdle model is applied to assess the eﬀects of diﬀerent
determinants on both the migrants’ propensity to send transfers abroad and the
amount of transfers.
The empirical analysis reveals that savings in the home country are highly rele-
vant for a relatively small group of immigrants (4.5%), while a relatively large part of
the immigrant population (13.1%-24.0%) sends payments to persons in the sending
countries. Moreover, migrants’ return intentions have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on all
types of payments abroad. The household size turns out to have a signiﬁcantly neg-
19ative impact on migrants’ transfers, indicating that migrants residing in relatively
large households do not seem to have the ﬁnancial capacity to send high amounts to
their home country. Women are less likely to send transfers abroad and – given that
their payments are positive – also send smaller amounts abroad than comparable
men. The estimates also suggest that both the propensity to remit and the level
of remittances are signiﬁcantly higher if close relatives live in the country of origin.
Furthermore, the relatively small income elasticities of migrants’ transfers suggest
that the pure altruism hypothesis, which postulates unity of the transfer-income
derivative, can be rejected. While the current gross income increases migrants’ sav-
ings and payments to persons abroad, the variation of past income streams increases
the amount of other transfers to the sending countries, indicating that these trans-
fers represent insurance payments to some extent. Finally, Vuong-tests suggest that
the double-hurdle model represents the correct speciﬁcation for the analysis of mi-
grants’ savings and remittances rather than the conventional Tobit model usually
applied in the literature.
20Appendix
Table: Deﬁnition of variables
Variable Description
Savings abroad Average monthly amount of savings abroad
(in real 2000 Euro, 1985-1995).
Other transfers abroad Average monthly amount of transfers abroad for other reasons
(in real 2000 Euro, 1985-1995).
Payments to family members abroad Average monthly amount of payments to family members abroad
(in real 2000 Euro, 1985-1995).
Payments to persons abroad Average monthly amount of payments to persons abroad
(in real 2000 Euro, 1996-2005).
Sent ﬁnancial transfers abroad 1985-1995: 1 if respondent reports to have sent ﬁnancial
transfers abroad last year; 0 otherwise.
1996-2005: 1 if respondent reports to have sent payments to
persons abroad last year; 0 otherwise.
Age Age of respondent in years.
Female 1 if respondent is female; 0 otherwise.
Income Household gross income (in real 2000 Euro).
Variance of past income Variance of household gross income over the
last 5 years.
Employed 1 if respondent is full- or part-time employed; 0 otherwise.
Years of education Education of respondent in years.
Attended school in Germany 1 if respondent attended school in Germany; 0 otherwise.
Household size Number of persons in household.
Married 1 if respondent is married; 0 otherwise.
Children below 5 years in household 1 if children below 5 years in household; 0 otherwise.
Children 5-15 years in household 1 if children between 5 and 15 years in household; 0 otherwise.
Spouse lives abroad 1 if spouse of respondent lives abroad; 0 otherwise.
Children live abroad 1 if children of respondent live abroad; 0 otherwise.
Intended return migration 1 if immigrant wishes to return to the country of origin;
0 otherwise.
Years since migration Duration of German residence in years.
Country of origin: Turkey 1 if respondent originates from Turkey; 0 otherwise.
Country of origin: Italy 1 if respondent originates from Italy; 0 otherwise.
Country of origin: Greece 1 if respondent originates from Greece; 0 otherwise.
Country of origin: Ex-Yugoslavia 1 if respondent originates from former Yugoslavia; 0 otherwise.
Country of origin: Other 1 if respondent originates from other OECD member country
(reference category); 0 otherwise.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
1985-1995 1996-2005
Standard Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Savings and remittances
Proportion of migrants saving abroad 0.045 0.004
Savings abroad 16.07 1.84
Savings abroad if > 0 354.87 29.31
Proportion of migrants sending other
transfers abroad 0.075 0.005
Other transfers abroad 18.97 1.55
Other transfers abroad if > 0 252.20 12.62
Proportion of migrants sending remittances
to family members 0.240 0.011
Payments to family members 56.34 4.80
Payments to family members if > 0 234.36 13.67
Proportion of migrants sending remittances
to persons abroad 0.131 0.012
Payments to persons abroad 22.87 3.12
Payments to persons abroad if > 0 174.11 16.44
Proportion of migrants sending ﬁnancial
transfers abroad 0.318 0.012 0.150 0.013
Explanatory variables
Socio-economic characteristics
Age 40.209 0.343 42.965 0.436
Female 0.446 0.010 0.501 0.013
Income 3180.88 66.648 3262.01 85.565
ln(Variance of past income) 12.121 0.056 12.370 0.081
Years of education 9.239 0.074 10.346 0.118
Attended school in Germany 0.200 0.012 0.242 0.016
Employed 0.733 0.011 0.640 0.015
Household composition
Household size 3.756 0.075 3.564 0.083
Married 0.782 0.013 0.812 0.014
Children <5 years in household 0.228 0.015 0.166 0.015
Children 5-15 in household 0.301 0.015 0.286 0.020
Spouse lives abroad 0.056 0.008 0.016 0.005
Children live abroad 0.083 0.008 0.039 0.008
Migration background
Intended return migration 0.643 0.015 0.393 0.019
Years since migration 18.688 0.237 22.743 0.430
Country of origin: Turkey 0.474 0.025 0.377 0.026
Country of origin: Italy 0.174 0.016 0.111 0.014
Country of origin: Greece 0.093 0.010 0.059 0.014
Country of origin: Ex-Yugoslavia 0.208 0.018 0.193 0.020
Country of origin: Other 0.051 0.007 0.260 0.024
N 12732 8849
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